EMPLOYMENT

LAW-EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL-AN

EMPLOYER MAY

RANDOMLY DRUG TEST AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE IN A SAFETY-SENSI-

TIVE POSITION WITHOUT VIOLATING PUBLIC POLICY WHICH PRO-

INTEREST-Hennessey v. Coastal
Eagle Point Oil Company, 129 NJ. 81, 609 A.2d 11 (1992).
TECTS THE EMPLOYEE'S PRIVACY

In the past thirty years many states have adopted the tort of
wrongful discharge' to soften the often harsh realities of the employment-at-will doctrine. 2 The common law employment-at-will
1 The tort of wrongful discharge is defined as: "An at-will employee's cause of
action against his former employer, alleging that his discharge was in violation of state
or federal anti-discrimination statutes[,j . . . public policy[,j an implied employment
contract[,] or an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.... ." BLAcK's L4w
DIcrioNARY 1612-13 (6th ed. 1991).
2 Some of the principle cases establishing the tort of wrongful discharge in eight
of the more industrialized states are identified as follows:
California: Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 692 (Cal. 1992) (allowing a discharged employee to bring action for wrongful discharge when claim was based on
furthering societal goals of eradicating sexual harassment); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d. 1330, 1335, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980) (recognizing the tort of wrongful
discharge when discharge, resulting from an employee's refusal to commit a criminal
act, violated public policy embodied in state statutes); Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr.
280, 286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding discharge for refusal to submit urine for a
random drug test violated public policy as found in the California Constitution's protection of personal privacy); Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
344 P.2d 25, 27, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that an employer may not discharge
an employee for refusing to commit perjury to protect the employer).
Connecticut: Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 386, 389
(Conn. 1980) (holding that an action for wrongful discharge in retaliation for ensuring that an employer's products complied with licensing and labeling regulations
could be brought as a violation of public policy); Battista v. United Illuminating Co.,
523 A.2d 1356, 1362-63 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987), certif denied 525 A.2d 1352 (Conn.
1987) (holding an employee must show more than incidental impact on public policy
to establish wrongful discharge).
Illinois: Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ill. 1981)
(recognizing the tort of wrongful discharge for employer violations of public policy
that included reporting employer violations of the Illinois criminal code); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (recognizing the tort of wrongful discharge where employee is fired in retaliation for filing a workmen's compensation
claim).
Massachusetts: DeRose v. Putnam Management Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 428, 431
(Mass. 1986) (recognizing that an employee testifying against an employer in a criminal trial constituted a public policy exception to the at-will employment contract).
Michigan: Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Mich.
1982) (affirming that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge did not exist for termination of an employee who chooses to disobey employer directive that violates the
ethical beliefs of a private association); Prysak v. R.L. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 631,
634 (Mich. CL App. 1992) (concluding that discharge of an employee who
threatened to protest against a customer of his employer was not a violation of public
policy encouraging free speech).
New York: Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 920, 922, 923 (N.Y.
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doctrine allowed either the employee or the employer to terminate
the employment relationship at any time for any cause or no

cause.3 The purpose of the employment-at-will doctrine was to protect both the interest of the employee to move freely and to find
satisfactory employment and the interest of the employer to manage his enterprise without outside interference.4 The origins of the
1987) (affirming common-law doctrine that an implied term of good faith incorporated into an employee relations manual applies only to an employment-at-will contract when the legislature enacts such protections); Pulsafeeder, Inc. v. Greene, 587
N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (N.Y. App. Div.), afftd, 587 N.Y.S.2d 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (refusing the tort of wrongful discharge for an employee-at-will).
Pennsylvania: Reese v. Tom Hesser Chevrolet-BMW, 604 A.2d 1072, 1074 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (determining that an employee's wrongful discharge action based on
that employee's refusal to restitute an employer's business losses did not violate "a
clearly defined mandate of public policy" as articulated by statutes).
Texas: McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. 1989) (holding
that discharge of an employee to avoid contributing to employee's pension plan was a
violation of public policy); Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735
(Tex. 1985) (recognizing a claim of wrongful discharge in retaliation for employee's
refusal to commit an illegal act). But cf., Hancock v. Express One Int'l, Inc., 800
S.W.2d 634, 635, 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that discharge in retaliation for
employee's refusal to violate federal statute that imposed only civil penalties did not
violate public policy).
3 Payne v. Western & Atlantic R. R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 517 (1884), overru/ed on
other grounds,Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 137 (1915). See also Edward M. Chen et
al., Common Law Privacy: A Limit On An Employer's Power to Test For Drugs, 12 GEO.
MASON U. L. REv. 651, 651 (1990) (asserting that both traditional and modern employers have monitored an employee's cleanliness, attendance at church and types of
cars driven to insure their employees would remain moral and fit for employment).
Drug testing employees, some commentators argue, is nothing more than a modern
form of "chemical surveillance," similar to the "paternalistic inspections" surveilling a
worker's personal habits. Id. at 652.
4 Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. IndustrialFreedom: On Limiting The
Abusive Exercise Of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1404, 1419 (1967). Professor
Blades compared the power of large corporations over its employees to the government's power over its citizens. Id. at 1404. Professor Blades stressed that because
technological advances made an employee's skills less marketable and only suitable
for his particular employer or the relatively small group of employers in that field,
employees were becoming immobilized in their particular field. Id. at 1405. The result of this unequal employment relationship, the professor posited, gave the employer power to control the employee in areas outside legitimate employer concern.
Id. at 1406. Professor Blades opined that the employment-at-will doctrine was created
in an era that defined the master/servant relationship as one in which the servant was
subject to the will of the master and unable to have a will of his own. Id. at 1416.
Justification for the doctrine, Professor Blades suggested was to give the employer
economic freedom to manage the enterprise in accordance with the employer's goals.
Id. Professor Blades recognized, however, that finding a boundary between the areas
of legitimate employer control and activities that bore no relationship to the employer's business purposes was difficult. Id. at 1407. The professor concluded that
the employment-at-will doctrine did not provide a remedy for such employer abuses.
Id. at 1410. Recognizing that the courts would not expand the application of constitutional restrictions to include private employers, Professor Blades called on legislatures
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employment-at-will doctrine stemmed from late nineteenth century American jurisprudence that emphasized freedom of contract
and laissez-faire economics.5
To forge a compromise between the competing and, at times,
inapposite interests of the employer and employee, the courts and
some legislatures have created a public policy exception to the emto modify the employment-at-will doctrine by enacting statutes that granted an employee broad protection against employer abuses. Id. at 1432, 1435. In doing so,
Professor Blades speculated that the courts would be free to fashion a remedy for
individual incidents of employer abuses. Id. at 1432-33.
One author has proposed that legislation be enacted that recognizes: 1) the employer's interest in managing the business free of second-guessing by courts; 2) the
inability of employees to change jobs because of specialized employment skills and/or
a benefit system based on seniority; and, 3) the public interest in encouraging employees to report employer wrongdoing. Claudia E. Decker, Comment, The At-Will
Doctrine: A Proposal To Modify the Texas Employment Relationship,36 BAYLOR L. Rzv. 667,
684-85, 687-88 (1984). See also David P. Weiss, Note, Public Policy Limitations To The
Employment At-Will Doctrine Since Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 44 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 1115 (1983) (criticizing the Pennsylvania Legislature's attempt under the Unjust Dismissal Act "to protect employees from unjust dismissals and articulate[ ] remedies in the event of an unjust discharge"). Specifically, Weiss chastised the Unjust
Dismissal Act's requirement that employers show "justcause" for discharging employees despite the employer's bad motive. Id. at 1140. The "just cause" standard, Weiss
contended, gave the employer a loophole to enforcement because a just cause showing of a legitimate business purpose for the discharge would exempt the employer
from liability. Id. at 1140-41. Conversely, under a "good faith" standard, the student
author concluded, the employer would have to rebut the employees claim of bad
motive, giving an employee greater protection. Id. at 1141.
5 See generally ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR (University of
North Carolina Press 1991) (tracing the history of the status of an employee from that
of the indentured servant to an individual with the freedom to barter his services for a
wage). See also Marsha Weisburst, Note, Guidelines ForA Public Policy Exception To The
Employment At Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REv. 617, 618 (1981)
(arguing that the policy consideration of employment-at-will rule has uncertain origins). Weisburst noted that while American courts were developing the employmentat-will doctrine, the English courts imposed a term of one year on an employment
contract for an unspecified term. Id. at 617. The rationales of the employment-at-will
doctrine cited most frequently by scholars were the late nineteenth century notions of
freedom of contract, laissezfaireeconomics and class struggles between business owners and managers. Id. at 618-19. Another reason for the development of the doctrine, Weisburst recognized, may have been the contract theory of mutuality of
obligation. Id. at 619. Because an employee was not required to work for the employer for any stated length of time, the courts, under mutuality of obligation,
granted the employer the same privilege of terminating the employment contract at
will. Id. at 619.
See also Note, ProtectingEmployees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge:The PublicPolicy
Exception, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931, 1933-34 (1983) (citing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-75 (1908)) (noting that the
employer's right to terminate an employee-at-will was elevated to a constitutional
right by the Supreme Court during the Lochner era).
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ployment-at-will doctrine. 6 This exception protects the employee
from discharge for failure to comply with an employer directive
that violates public policy.7 Originally, the public policy exception
applied only to employer actions that affected the interests of society at large as defined under statutes, administrative decisions,
some codes of professional ethics and the common law. 8
Recent judicial decisions and statutory enactments, however,
have recognized an employee's right to privacy as a more personal
source to the public policy exception, particularly in the context of
random drug testing by employers. 9 The introduction of privacy
6 Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 69, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 510, 512
(1980); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331 (1980).
7 Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. Additionally, NewJersey and a number of
other states have enacted "Whistle Blower" statutes that prohibit an employer from
discharging an employee for reporting illegal employer activities to the authorities.
See infra note 77 (citing the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:19-1 et seq. (West Supp. 1982), which prohibits an employer from taking retaliatory action against an employee who discloses an employer's illegal activities to a supervisor or public body).
8 Pierce 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
9 See, e.g., Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 99, 609 A.2d 11,
19 (1992) (holding that the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine included protection of a privacy interest that prevented a private employer from
randomly drug testing employees in non-safety sensitive positions); Semore v. Pool,
266 Cal.Rptr. 280, 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling,
Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989) (same).
Recently, Connecticut, Florida, and Iowa have enacted legislation that regulates
private employer drug testing. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51t to -51bb (West Supp.
1992); FL. STAT. ANN. § 440.102 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (West Supp.
1992). Generally, Florida's and Iowa's statutes follow the Connecticut statute, which
provides in relevant part:
§ 31-51u. Drug testing: Requirements
(a) No employer may determine an employee's eligibility for promotion, additional compensation, transfer, termination, disciplinary or
other adverse personnel action solely on the basis of a positive urinalysis drug test result unless (1) the employer has given the employee a
urinalysis drug test, utilizing a reliable methodology, which produced a
positive result and (2) such positive test result was confirmed by a second urinalysis drug test, which was separate and independent from the
initial test, utilizing a gas chromatography and mass spectrometry
methodology or a methodology which has been determined by the commissioner of health services to be as reliable or more reliable than the
gas chromatography and mass spectrometry methodology.
(b) No person performing a urinalysis drug test pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall report, transmit or disclose any positive test
result of any test performed in accordance with subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section unless such test result has been confirmed in
accordance with subdivision (2) of said subsection (a).
§ 31-51x. Drug testing: Reasonable suspicion required. Random tests.
(a) No employer may require an employee to submit to a urinalysis
drug test unless the employer has reasonable suspicion that the em-
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into the public policy exception through employee drug testing is
problematic because the private activity of the employee may conflict with the interests of society as a whole.' 0 While drug and alcohol abuse is considered one of the more dangerous problems
society faces," the methods used to detect and presumptively deter
this behavior engender grave privacy issues.' 2 Unregulated drug
testing in the private sector can lead to unwarranted intrusions
ployee is under the influence of drugs or alcohol which adversely affects
or could adversely affect such employee's job performance....
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section,
an employer may require an employee to submit to a urinalysis drug test
on a random basis if (1) such test is authorized under federal law, (2)
the employee serves in an occupation which has been designated as a
high-risk or safety sensitive occupation pursuant to regulations adopted
by the commissioner of labor pursuant to chapter 54, or (3) the urinalysis is conducted as part of an employee assistance program sponsored
or authorized by the employer in which the employee voluntarily
participates.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN §§ 31-51u, 31-51x (West Supp. 1992) (footnote omitted). Recently, the federal government enacted legislation that required operators of mass
transportation equipment, drivers of commercial motor vehicles, and railroad operators to submit to "preemployment, reasonable suspicion, random, and post accident
testing." See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1618a(b) (1) (West Supp. 1992) (mass transportation
equipment operators); 49 U.S.C.A. § 2717(a) (West Supp. 1992) (commercial motor
vehicle drivers); 45 U.S.C.A. § 431 (r) (1) (A) (West Supp. 1992) (railroad operators).
These statutes employ similar testing methods to Connecticut's statute. See 49
U.S.C.A. §§ 1618a(d) (1)-(8), 2717(d) (1)-(8) (West Supp. 1992) (outlining the procedures for drug testing); 45 U.S.C.A. § 431(r) (2) (A)-(H) (West Supp. 1992) (same).
10 Hennessey, 129 NJ. at 116, 609 A.2d at 28 (Pollock, J., concurring).
1 See Ronald Sullivan, Motorman Gets 5 to 15 Years in Crash, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 7,
1992, at 25 (reporting on a serious New York City subway crash caused by an intoxicated motorman in which five passengers died). On August 28, 1991, Robert Ray, a
motorman for the New York City subway system, lost control of his train carrying over
200 passengers and caused an accident killing five people and injuring 26. Id. On
October 15, 1992, Ray was convicted of all five counts of manslaughter and 26 counts
of assault. Id. The prosecution argued successfully that Ray's alcohol intoxication
while operating the train showed reckless indifference to human life. Id. Rejecting
Ray's request for leniency, Judge Daniel P. Fitzgerald responded, "Your actions were
unconscionable. Lives were lost, ruined and shattered." Id. Judge Fitzgerald then
sentenced Ray to the maximum of five to fifteen years for the manslaughter convictions, and one to seven years for each assault conviction involving the 26 injured passengers. Id. All sentences, the judge ordered, would run concurrently as required by
law. Id.
Additionally, the Federal Register Administration surveyed train accidents occurring in the United States during the period between 1975 through 1984. Control of
Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations, 50 Fed. Reg. 31,517 (1985) (codified
at 49 C.F.R. §§ 212, 217-19, 225). This study revealed that 48 accidents were attributable to alcohol or drug use. Id. These accidents resulted in 37 fatalities, 80 injuries,
and $34.2 million in direct damages to railroad property and environmental cleanup.
Id.
12 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1988) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989)) (requir-
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into the private lives of employees.13 Moreover, unreliable and inaccurate results often wrongly implicate employees of drug use or
fail to identify individuals who may be a danger to society because
of a substance-abuse problem. 4 As a result, many employers are
ing employees to produce urine for chemical testing invaded a reasonable
expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment).
13 Hennessey, 129 NJ. at 99, 609 A.2d at 19 (arguing that giving a urine sample as
part of a random drug test may result in revealing confidential, irrelevant information
to an employer and an intrusion of privacy if the test is performed in the presence of
an observer).
14 See generally Kurt M. Dubowski, Ph.D., Drug-Use Testing: Scientific Perspectives, 11
NovA L. REV. 415 (1987) (explaining the modem types of available drug screening
devices and their problems). Dr. Dubowski noted that use of urine as a specimen in
drug testing is rooted in three practical considerations: emphasis on non-invasive collection methods, suitability in testing large numbers of people and ability to perform
a number of tests from one sample. Id. at 433. Despite these advantages, Dr. Dubowski criticized the use of urine as a reliable test to determine present drug impairment
of the individual. Id. Because urine is the end product of the human body's metabolism, Dr. Dubowski determined only past impairment will be identified. Id. at 528.
Moreover, because of the ability of the testee to dilute urine with water or other substances and thus reduce potential drug concentrations, Dr. Dubowski contended that
urine testing presented many accuracy problems. Id. at 433. Additionally, the doctor
pointed out that urine testing was only useful for identifying the presence of a given
drug in the body; it did not provide, by itself, any conclusions as to the degree of
impairment. Id. at 435. The author also warned that urine is susceptible to tampering if the chain of custody is not well documented and secure. Id. at 418. For this
reason, Dr. Dubowski recommended that strict chain of custody rules, similar to those
for other forensic evidence, should be enacted to protect the accuracy of the results.
Id. at 417-18.
Furthermore, Dr. Dubowski cautioned that serious qualitative problems such as
the number of false positives and/or false negatives have called into question the
accuracy of these tests. Id. at 494-95. Dr. Dubowski advised that the state or federal
government perform on-site inspection of these laboratories for regulation and accreditation purposes. Id. at 496.
An added criticism of drug testing concerns the excessive costs of properly testing urine for drugs that most employers are incapable of paying. Arthur J. McBay,
Ph.D., Efficient Drug Testing Addressing the Basic Issues, 11 NOVA L. REv. 647, 648
(1987). Dr. McBay emphasized that less expensive methods of testing were not adequate due to the possibility of false negatives and false positives. Id. The author continued that to ensure accuracy any inexpensive initial drug screening method would
require a more expensive confirmatory test. Id. Dr. McBay explained that the initial
test and appropriate follow-up procedures had the potential of costing $1,000 per
individual. Id. Moreover, Dr. McBay concluded that a primary purpose of the test was
defeated because a positive test did not show the present level of impairment. Id. at
649.
Most importantly, Dr. McBay questioned the large amount of resources being
channelled to detect illegal drug-use when alcohol use was by far the most prevalent
cause of death and injury associated with the workplace. Id. at 650-51. Additionally,
Dr. McBay emphasized that alcohol testing was less expensive, more accurate and less
invasive than any of the currently used drug tests. Id. at 651.
For a more detailed discussion on the accuracy of the drug tests commercially
available, see George D. Lundberg, M.D., Mandatory Unindicated Urine Drug Screening.
Still ChemicalMcCarthyism, 256 JAMA 3003, 3004, 3005 (1986) (arguing that statistical
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inhibited from implementing drug tests designed to protect society
from drug and alcohol abuse in the workplace because of the
threat of a wrongful discharge suit.' 5 In a recent case, Hennessey v.
Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co.,' 6 the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed an employee's right to privacy in the employment-at-will
context and held that an employer can discharge an employee engaged in a safety-sensitive job for failing a random drug test. 7 The
Hennessey court concluded, however, that absent an overriding public interest in safety, an employer's discharge of an employee who
refused to submit to a random drug test violated public policy that
protects against the invasion of an employee's privacy.' 8
Shortly after Coastal Eagle acquired its refinery in Burlington
County, New Jersey, the company conducted a pre-employment
physical that included a drug test.' 9 The test indicated that 19% of
data indicates that drug-use among the general population is low and that wide
spread drug testing would result in a high false-positive indication of drug use, thus
transforming our system ofjustice from one based on a presumption of innocence to
one based on a presumption of guilt); Richard H. Schwartz, M.D., & Richard L.
Hawks, Ph.D., Laboratory Detection of Marijuana Use, 254 JAMA 788, 790 (1985)
(describing the accuracy of various drug tests ranging from the enzyme immunoassay
technique, a less accurate but more commonly used front line test, to gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, the most accurate and expensive); Richard H. Schwartz,
M.D., et al., Urinary Cannabinoids in Monitoring Abstinence in a Drug Abuse Treatment
Program, 111 ARCH PATHOL LAB MErD 708, 710-11 (1987) (discussing the problem of
false-negative results caused by the detection of chemically similar but legal substances, and the increasing knowledge among potential testees for marijuana that
other legal substances "sanitize" the urine); Scientific Issues in Drug Testing, 257 JAMA
3110, 3113 (1987) (hereinafter Scientific Issues] (recommending confirmatory tests to
verify front line drug test results and prevent tampering).
15 Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 116, 609 A.2d 11, 28
(1992) (Pollock, J. concurring) (quotation omitted); Fredric M. Knapp & Laura L.
McLester, The DwindlingEmployment-at-Will Doctrine:Random Drug Testing in PrivateEmployment Since Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Oil Company, N.J. LAYwER, Feb./Mar. 1993,
at 11-12 (predicting private employers will not implement drug testing programs for
fear of litigation by a discharged employee).
16 129 N.J. 81, 609 A.2d 11 (1992).
17 Id. at 88, 107, 609 A.2d at 14, 23.
18 Id. at 99, 100, 609 A.2d at 19, 20. The court relied partially on the New Jersey
Constitution, Article I, Paragraph 1 for this proposition. Id. at 95, 99, 609 A.2d at 18,
19. This paragraph of the NewJersey Constitution states in relevant part: "All persons
are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1.
The United States Constitution has no express language that protects privacy.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). In Griswold, however, the United
States Supreme Court found a penumbra of privacy emanating from the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Id. at 482-85.
19 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 85, 609 A.2d. at 13. In 1985, Coastal Eagle purchased the
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Coastal Eagle's employees tested positive for some form of drug
use. 20 Coastal Eagle then issued a company directive that prohibited on-the-job drug use, required notification to management if
an employee was taking prescription drugs that could impair performance and offered rehabilitation assistance to employees who
voluntarily disclosed their drug use.2 1 Additionally, drug-testing
could be conducted at any time to insure compliance with the directive, and noncompliance would result in an employee's
dismissal.2 2
After obtaining evidence that employees were using marijuana
while on the job, Coastal Eagle conducted a random urine analysis
drug testing program. 23 James Hennessey tested positive for marijuana and diazepam 24 and was fired immediately. 25 Hennessey
then filed a wrongful discharge suit,26 alleging inter alia that ran-

dom employee drug testing was an unconstitutional search and
seizure and an invasion of privacy under both the common law
refinery from Texaco Oil. Id. Texaco had no formal drug testing policy. Id. Coastal
Eagle argued that the acquisition of the Texaco refinery established a new employment relationship with the refinery employees and therefore justified the pre-employment physicals and drug test. Id. at 85-86, 609 A.2d at 13.
20 Id. at 86, 609 A.2d at 13. James Hennessey, the plaintiff, tested negative for
drugs in this first examination of Coastal Eagle employees. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. Coastal Eagle found urine analysis to be the least intrusive of the drug
screening methods. Id. The samples were collected while an observer watched the
employee to protect the validity of the test. Id. Coastal Eagle tested only for drugs
and positive results were confirmed by a different test. Id. Additionally, Coastal Eagle
repealed the rehabilitation assistance program. Id.
24 Id. at 87, 609 A.2d at 13. Diazepam is the chemical ingredient of the schedule II
narcotic commonly known by its brand name Valium. J.B. LIPPINCOTr Co., FACrs AND
COMPARISONS LOOsE-LEAF DRUG INFORMATION SERVICE 288e (1988). Valium is a prescription tranquilizer commonly used to alleviate stress but is also prescribed for relieving muscle spasms. Id. Hennessey did not dispute the accuracy of the test nor the
fact that diazepam was taken without a prescription. Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 87, 609
A.2d at 13.
25 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 87, 609 A.2d at 13.
26 Specifically, Hennessey filed a six count complaint against Coastal Eagle. Id. at
87, 609 A.2d at 13. The six counts plead by Hennessey were: wrongful discharge;
invasion of privacy; violations of New Jersey Constitution Article I, Paragraph 1 (generally protecting privacy) and Article I, Paragraph 7 (prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures); violation of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -42; breach of contract; and negligent or intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Id. at 87, 609 A.2d at 13-14.
27 Hennessey claimed the request for him to submit to a drug test violated the New
Jersey Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures because it
was not founded on any reasonable suspicion of drug use. Id., 609 A.2d at 14. The
New Jersey Constitution Article I, Paragraph 7 states: "The right of the people to be
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and the New Jersey Constitution."8 Granting Hennessey's motion
for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Coastal Eagle violated public policy by requesting a drug test in the absence
of any reasonable suspicion of employee drug use. 29 The New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed, concluding
that private employers, unlike public employers, were not constrained to constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' Moreover, the appellate court reasoned
that the other sources of privacy cited by Hennessey were too amorphous to support a wrongful discharge claim against a private
employer.3 1
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification. 2 First,
the court affirmed that private employers were not bound to the
same constitutional constraints concerning searches and seizures
as public employers. 3 The Hennessey Court then held that an atwill employee who occupied a safety-sensitive position and failed a
random drug test had no cause of action for the tort of wrongful
discharge.34 Criticizing the appellate division, however, the court
recognized that the public policy exception to the employment-atwill doctrine still protected an employee's privacy interests but only
when that interest outweighed the public's interest in safety. 5
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated;..." NJ. CONsr. art. I, para. 7 (1947).
28 Hennessey, 129 NJ. at 87, 609 A.2d at 13. The NewJersey Constitution article I,
paragraph 1 reads in pertinent part: "All persons are by nature free and independent,
and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." NJ. CONST. art. I, para. 1 (1947).
The parties stipulated to a dismissal of Hennessey's claim that Coastal Eagle violated
New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination. Hennessey, 129 NJ. at 87, 609 A.2d at 14.
29 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 87, 609 A.2d at 14. Relying on FraternalOrder of Police v.
City of Newark, 216 NJ. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1987), which held that
public policy included the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the trial court concluded that policy applied to private employers such
as Coastal Eagle. Id. For a discussion of FraternalOrder of Police v. City of Newark, see
infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the
remainder of the counts. Hennessey, 129 NJ. at 87, 609 A.2d at 14.
30 Id. at 88, 609 A.2d at 14 (quoting Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 247
N.J. Super. 297, 305, 589 A.2d 170, 175 (App. Div. 1991)).
31 Id. (citing Hennessey, 247 NJ. Super. at 308, 589 A.2d 170).
32 126 N.J. 340, 598 A.2d 897 (1991).
33 Hennessey, 129 NJ. at 95, 609 A.2d at 17-18.
34 Id. at 88, 609 A.2d at 14.
35 Id. at 99, 100, 609 A.2d at 19, 20. Specifically, the supreme court criticized the
appellate court for giving "short shrift" to the protection of an employee's privacy
interest under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. at
95, 609 A.2d at 17-18. For a full discussion of the balancing test used by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, see infra notes 136-149 and accompanying text.
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Although traditionally an employer could discharge an at-will
employee with or without cause,3 6 the New Jersey Supreme Court
first recognized a limitation on that right in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Coip.3 7 In Pierce, Dr. Grace Pierce refused to continue research and development of the drug loperamide3 because doing
so violated her interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath.3 9 After a
number of discussions with Ortho Pharmaceutical about changing
The doctor
projects, Dr. Pierce resigned from the company.'
then filed a wrongful discharge suit, claiming that her resignation
was the result of Ortho Pharmaceutical's pressure to violate her
ethical beliefs. 4
Addressing Dr. Pierce's contentions, the supreme court recognized that employers sometimes use the at-will employment status
to force employees to violate the law or face discharge.4 2 To correct
this situation, the majority followed the growing trend in the law
that recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine.43 Justice Pollock posited that an employee would have an
action for wrongful discharge if terminated for disregarding an employer's direction to violate "a clear mandate of public policy.""
For sources of public policy, the majority looked to legislation, ju36 Payne v. The Western & Atlantic RRL Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 517 (1884), overnu/ed on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
37 84 N.J. 58, 71-72, 417 A.2d 505, 511-12 (1980).
38 Loperamide was developed as a potential treatment for diarrhea in infants, children and the elderly. Id. at 62, 417 A.2d at 506-07.
39 Id. at 63, 417 A.2d at 507. Dr. Pierce objected to the use of saccharin in the
formula of loperamide because of medical controversy surrounding the safety of
saccharin. Id. at 62-63, 417 A.2d at 507. Because of these risks, Dr. Pierce believed
Ortho's decision to seek approval from the Food and Drug Administration to begin
clinical studies on and formulation of a new drug would result in her violating the
Hippocratic Oath. Id. at 63, 417 A.2d at 507. Dr Pierce acknowledged, however, that
her medical conclusion concerning the use of saccharin was a matter of opinion and
not a medical certainty. Id.
40 Id. at 63-64, 417 A.2d at 507-08. The NewJersey Supreme Court did not address
Ortho Pharmaceutical's assertion that a claim of wrongful discharge cannot be
brought when an employee resigns. Id. at 65, 417 A.2d at 508 (citation omitted). The
supreme court upheld the trial court's decision that a fact question existed as to
whether Ortho had induced Dr. Pierce to resign by forcing her to choose between
continued employment or violating the Hippocratic Oath. Id. at 64-65, 417 A.2d at
507-08.
41 Id. at 64, 417 A.2d at 508.
42 Id. at 67, 417 A.2d at 509.
43 Id. at 67-70, 72, 417 A.2d at 509-11, 512.
44 Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. The majority continued that a cause of action could
lie in both contract and tort. Id. The contract claim would be based on breach of an
implied term not to fire an employee who refused to perform an act violating public
policy. Id. The tort action would lie in a breach of the employer's duty not to violate
public policy. Id. Additionally, the Piercecourt postulated that in a tort action, puni-
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dicial decisions, administrative rules and regulations.45 The
supreme court determined, however, that the Hippocratic Oath

was not a source of public policy.4 6 Accordingly, Justice Pollock

concluded that Dr. Pierce did not have a cause of action against
Ortho Pharmaceutical because her refusal to work was not based
on public policy but rather on her own ethical beliefs. 47
Shortly after its landmark decision in Pierce, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in LaUy v. Copygraphics addressed a claim of
wrongful discharge based on an employer's retaliation against an
employee who filed a claim under the Workmen's Compensation
statute. 49 The supreme court found that the statute, which prohibited an employer from discharging an employee for filing a
worker's compensation claim, was a source of public policy. 50 The
majority held that such retaliatory discharges established a cause of
action for wrongful discharge independent of other statutory remedies.5 1 Moreover, the legislative intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act was to provide additional relief for the employee
under the Act's own enumerated remedies of restoration of employment and compensation of lost wages.5" The majority posited
that society rendered this type of employer behavior abusive to the
employee, thus making such conduct violative of a clear mandate
of public policy set forth in Pierce.5" Accordingly, the pursuit of a
civil remedy, the Lally court concluded,
would aid in enforcing em54
ployer compliance with this statute.

tive damages could be awarded as a deterrent to future employer misconduct. Id.
(citations omitted).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 76, 417 A.2d at 514.
47 Id. at 75, 417 A.2d at 513-14.
48 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981).
49 Id. at 670, 428 A.2d at 1318. The Workmen's Compensation Statute reads in
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any employer or his duly authorized agent to
discharge ... an employee as to his employment because such employee has claimed
or attempted to claim workmen's compensation benefits from such employer ......
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-39.1 (West Supp. 1992).
50 La/!y, 85 N.J. at 670, 428 A.2d at 1318.
51 Id. The majority noted an employee who was discharged in retaliation for filing
a claim could also seek penal sanctions in municipal court in a disorderly persons
action or administrative relief with the Commissioner of Labor and Industry. Id.
52 Id. at 671-72, 428 A.2d at 1319. The Workmen's Compensation Act provides in
relevant part: "Any employee so discriminated against shall be restored to his employment and shall be compensated by his employer for any loss of wages arising out of
such discrimination;. . . ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-39.1 (West Supp. 1992).
53 Lally, 85 N.J. at 670, 428 A.2d at 1318.
54 Id. at 670-71, 417 A.2d at 1318.
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In a factually similar case to Pierce,5" Kalman v. Grand Union

Co. 56

presented the issue of whether a licensed pharmacist's adherence to both legislation and professional ethics was a clear mandate of public policy that protected the pharmacist from a
wrongful discharge.5 7 In Kalman, a licensed pharmacist staffed a

supermarket pharmacy counter in compliance with the Code of
Professional Conduct of the American Pharmaceutical Association
(Professional Code)58 and a statute that required the presence of a
pharmacist during store hours.59 The pharmacist's action contradicted his supervisor's instructions and resulted in his immediate
dismissal.6' In a wrongful discharge suit, the pharmacist relied on
both the statute and the Professional Code as sources of public
policy. 6 1

Reversing the trial court,62 the Kalman court held that the
sources of public policy proffered by the plaintiff permitted an em55 See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text (discussing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co.).
56 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (App. Div. 1982).
57 Id. at 157-58, 443 A-2d at 729-30.
58 The pharmacist relied on the following paragraph from the Code of Ethics of
the American Pharmaceutical Association:
A PHARMACIST has the duty to observe the law, to uphold the dignity
and honor of the profession, and to accept its ethical principles. He
should not engage in any activity that will bring discredit to the profession and should expose, withoutfear orfavor, illegal or unethicalconduct in
the profession.
Id. at 158, 443 A.2d at 730 (citing Code of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical
Association) (emphasis in original).
59 Id. at 155-56, 157, 443 A.2d at 728-29, 730 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-30).
Sidney Kalman was the "pharmacist-in-charge" at the pharmacy located in the Grand
Union supermarket. Id. at 155, 443 A.2d at 728. Because the pharmacy was not partitioned from the remainder of the store, the entire store was licensed as a pharmacy.
Id., 443 A.2d at 728-29. The pharmacist, therefore, was required by N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:14-1 et seq. to be on-duty while the store was open. Id. at 157-58, 443 A.2d at 730.
The Board of Pharmacy verified Kalman's belief that the store needed to staff the
counter with a pharmacist while open to the public. Id. at 155-56, 443 A.2d at 729.
The Board of Pharmacy's advice, however, directly contradicted the advice given to
Kalman by his supervisor, who claimed the Board had given Kalman permission to
close the pharmacy. Id. at 155, 443 A.2d at 729.
60 Id. at 156, 443 A.2d at 729.
61 Id. at 157-58, 443 A.2d at 729-30.
62 The trial court granted Grand Union's motion for summaryjudgment and held
that the authorities cited by Kalman as sources of public policy were too personal and
therefore did not constitute a clear mandate of public policy as required under Pierce,
Id. at 156, 157, 443 A.2d at 729-30. The trial court reasoned that the administrative
regulation and code governing the practice of pharmacy cited by Kalman were analogous to the Hippocratic Oath cited by the plaintiff in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical84
N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). Id., at 156, 443 A.2d at 729. The trial court concluded
Kalman's case was based on personal conviction not supported by a clear mandate of
public policy and therefore had to be dismissed. Id.
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ployee to state a cause of action for wrongful discharge.63 Distinguishing Pierce, the appellate court asserted that the pharmacist was
complying with his legal obligations rather than his conscience.6
In doing so, the Kalman court concluded that a clear mandate of
public policy existed in the administration regulations and Professional Code.65 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that these
regulations furthered public policy because they protected the
public from unsupervised dispensing or theft of dangerous substances.66 The court also asserted that the Professional Code not
only served the interest of the pharmaceutical community but also
protected society at large.67
Moving from the civil to criminal context, the New Jersey appellate division in Potterv. Village Bank ofNewJersefPS faced the issue
of whether an employee who blew the whistle on his employer's
criminal activities was protected from a retaliatory discharge.69 In
Potter, the appellate court held that public policy required protection of employees who notified the appropriate authorities of their
employer's illegal activities. 7° Furthermore, the court posited that
an employer's retaliatory discharge for terminating an employee
who reports unlawful conduct constituted an intentional tort that
allowed for punitive, economic and non-economic compensatory
damages.71
Dale Potter was president and chief executive officer of Village
Bank of New Jersey when he discovered a possible money-laundering operation at the bank.72 Potter gave notice of his suspicion to
the New Jersey Commissioner of Banking (Commissioner) who
then conducted investigative audits of the bank.73 Shortly after
Id. at 159, 443 A.2d at 730-31.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 158, 443 A.2d at 730.
66 Id. (citing Board of Pharmacy v. Quackenbush & Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 334, 335-36,
39 A.2d 28, 29-30 (C.P. 1940)).
67 Id. at 159, 443 A.2d at 730.
68 225 N.J. Super. 547, 543 A.2d 80, certif. denied, 113 N.J. 352, 550 A.2d 462 (1988).
69 Id. at 550, 543 A.2d at 81.
70 Id. at 560, 543 A.2d at 87.
71 Id. at 561, 562, 543 A.2d at 87, 88. The appellate court listed examples of losses
that an employee who sustained a retaliatory discharge claim could recover, including
lost wages less unemployment insurance, costs of finding substitute employment,
emotional distress associated with the discharge and loss of fringe benefits. Id. (citations omitted).
72 Id. at 552, 543 A.2d at 82.
73 Id. at 552-53, 543 A.2d at 82-83. Subsequently, the United States District Attorney's office subpoenaed the bank, requesting a list of accounts pursuant to its own
Treasury Department investigation. Id at 553, 543 A.2d at 83. The Department of
Justice also interviewed Potter regarding the possible scam. Id.
63
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learning of Potter's conversation with the Commissioner, the bank
dismissed Potter without cause. 4 Potter filed a wrongful termination complaint and sought reinstatement to his former position.7'
On the issue of retaliatory discharge, ajury awarded Potter $50,000
in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.7 6
Upholding Potter's wrongful discharge claim and affirming
the jury award, the appellate court concluded that public policy
encourages citizens to report criminal activity.7 7 These objectives,
the Potter court reasoned, would be frustrated if employees were
not protected for reporting an employer's illegal conduct. 78 Af74 Id. at 553-55, 543 A.2d at 83-84. Upon learning of Potter's whistle blowing, one
of the directors and controlling stockholders, Mory Kraselnick, became angry and
asked Potter the basis for his discussion with the Commissioner. Id. Potter revealed
his suspicions of money laundering, and Kraselnick agreed that such a scheme was
possible. Id. at 553-54, 543 A.2d at 83.
75 Id. at 550, 543 A.2d at 81.
76 Id. at 551, 543 A.2d at 82. Potter also received $12,575.40 in prejudgment interest. Id.
77 Id. at 559, 543 A.2d at 86 (citation omitted). For guidance the appellate court
also looked to the recently enacted Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:19-1 et seq. Id. at 560, 543 A.2d at 86-87. The Conscientious Employee Protection Act reads in pertinent part:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following:
a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public
body an activity, policy or practice of the employer . . . that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation
promulgated pursuant to law; ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West Supp. 1992). Although the Conscientious Employee
Protection Act was enacted subsequent to Potter's termination, the court determined
that the statute codified the common law tort established in judicial decisions. Potter,
225 N.J. Super. at 560, 543 A.2d at 86.
Additionally, 25 states have enacted statutes that prohibit either public or private
employers from using retaliatory discharge against an employee who reports the illegal conduct of the employer. See, e.g., AAstKA STAT. § 24.60.035 (1992); ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 38-532(A)-(M) (West Supp. 1992); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(a)-(c) (West
1989); CoL. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-50.5-103 et seq., § 24-114-101, et seq. (West 1990);
CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-6ldd, 31-51m (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 112.3187 (West 1992); HAw. REv. STAT. § 378-62 etseq. (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 740, para. 175/1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.29 et seq. (West
1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (West Supp.
1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 831 et seq. (West 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A
§ 12G (1992); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 15.361 et seq. (West 1981); NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 281.611 et seq. (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-240 et seq., 126-84 et
seq. (1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.51 etseq. (Anderson Supp. 1991); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1421 etseq. (1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-15-1 etseq. (1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 8-27-10 etseq. (Law Co-op Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 60-11-17.1 (1992);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 50-1-304 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-1 et seq. (1992); W. VA.
CODE § 6C-1-1 et seq. (1993).
78 Potter, 225 N.J. Super at 559-60, 543 A.2d at 86. The appellate court sympathized
with the dilemma that many employees face in choosing to report criminal activity
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firming both the compensatory and punitive awards, the court posited that the measure of damages was similar to those available for
other torts.79
The New Jersey appellate division first addressed the issue of
privacy as a source of public policy in Slohoda v. United ParcelService,
Inc.8 0 In Slohoda, the court held that it was error to dismiss a complaint on the issue of whether a company policy, in which employees could be terminated for engaging in sexual relations with a coworker based on marital status, violated an employee's right to privacy.8 Jon Slohoda, an employee of United Parcel Service,
claimed his discharge for adultery violated New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination which prohibited employment discrimination based on marital status." Arguing that the right to privacy is
protected by public policy, Slohoda claimed his discharge was in
retaliation for exercising this right."5
The court agreed with Slohoda's claim that a policy restricting
the personal relations between co-workers on the basis of marital
status violated the anti-discrimination statute.8 4 Moreover, the
and losing their job or not reporting unlawful activity and keeping their job. Id. at
560, 543 A.2d at 86. The court recognized that absent protection from retaliatory
discharges, employees would be reluctant to cooperate with the authorities, resulting
in a "chilling effect on criminal investigations." Id.
79 Id. at 561, 543 A.2d at 87. The appellate court reasoned that a retaliatory discharge was an action in tort because an employer breached his or her duty not to
discharge an employee who obeyed the law. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 84 N.J. 58, 72-73, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980)). Accordingly, the Potter court
held punitive damages were proper to deter this type of behavior. Id.
80 193 N.J. Super. 586, 594, 475 A.2d 618, 622 (1984).
81 Id. at 589-90, 475 A.2d at 619-20.
82 Id. at 588, 589, 475 A.2d at 619. Slohoda claimed his discharge was the result of
his sexual relationship with a co-worker while he was legally married to another woman. Id. at 589, 475 A.2d at 619. Because United Parcel Service (UPS) did not have a
similar policy concerning unmarried workers who engage in sexual relations with
other co-workers, the court opined that the decision to discharge Slohoda was based
on marital status and violated the Law Against Discrimination. Id. at 589-90, 475 A.2d
at 619-20.
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination states:
It shall be unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an
unlawful discrimination:
a. For an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, maritalstatus, affectional or sexual orientation, sex or
atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait of any individual . .. to discharge.., from employment such individual or to discriminate against
such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
83 Slohoda, 193 N.J. Super. at 593, 475 A.2d at 621.
84 Id. at 590, 475 A.2d at 620. The majority also noted that UPS had an anti-nepo-
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Slohoda court concluded that an invasion of an employee's privacy
by an employer constituted a violation of a clear mandate of public
policy as defined by Pierceand supported a claim of wrongful discharge.85 Accordingly, the court concluded the trial court erred in
8 6
dismissing Slohoda's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Following the Slohoda decision, the New Jersey appellate division grappled with the issue of a public employer's implementation
of a drug test as a violation of the state's constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures."' In FraternalOrder of
Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark,' the appellate division
held that a public employer could not require a drug test from an
employee unless there was an "individual reasonable suspicion"
that the employee used drugs.8 9 Shortly after the Police Director
tism rule that lawfully prohibited a UPS employee who was married to another UPS
employee from occupying a supervisory or management position. Id. at 592, 475 A.2d
at 621. The court declined to determine whether Slohoda was discharged for violating this policy. Id. at 593, 475 A.2d at 621. The Slohoda court recognized, however,
that UPS had a right to show that Slohoda was terminated under the anti-nepotism
policy rather than the policy prohibiting sexual relations between married co-workers.
Id.
85 Id. at 593, 475 A.2d at 621-22.
86 Id. at 589, 475 A.2d at 619. The appellate court remanded the case to develop
the factual record on the issue of whether UPS' policy invaded an employee's privacy
and, therefore, violated public policy. Id. at 594, 475 A.2d at 622.
87 Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 216 N.J.
Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1987). The NewJersey Constitution, in Article I,
Paragraph 7 states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
... " NJ. CONsT. art. I, para. 7 (1947).
88 Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 216 NJ.
Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1987).
89 Id. at 474, 524 A.2d at 437. The appellate court recognized that the NewJersey
Constitution granted greater privacy protection in the area of search and seizure than
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 477, 524 A.2d at 43839 (citations omitted). The New Jersey Supreme Court has determined that the
state's constitution afforded individuals greater protections than the United States
Constitution in other circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 195,
198-200, 576 A.2d 793, 799, 801-02 (1990) (giving the definition of "reasonable expectation in privacy" under the search and seizure provision of the New Jersey Constitution broader protection than under the United States Constitution); State v. Ramseur,
106 N.J. 123, 167, 524 A.2d 188, 209 (1987) (noting that in death penalty cases, a
broad reading of state constitution is required because "considerations of federalism
...have constrained the United States Supreme Court" when determining the constitutionality of capital punishment under the federal constitution); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 292-93, 301, 450 A.2d 925, 928, 932 (1982) (cautioning that in the
abortion context "[wihere provisions of the federal and state Constitutions differ...
or where a previously established body of state law leads to a different result, then we
[the Court] must determine whether a more expansive grant of right is mandated by
our state Constitution."). Moreover, the FraternalOrder of Policecourt determined that
reliance based solely on the federal constitution might require "needless review in the

1993]

NOTE

of Newark issued a memorandum requiring all members of the
Narcotics Bureau to submit a urine sample for drug-testing, the
Fraternal Order of Police filed an action claiming such a requirewould be a search of the police officers without probable
ment 90
cause.
First, the appellate court rejected the City's argument that because police officers were members of a highly regulated industry,
drug tests were permissible without warrants.91 The appellate
court reasoned that although police officers were subjected to a
number of administrative and statutory regulations, these types of
law enforcement officials were not included within sensitive industries that required close inspection.92 Second, the court contended that the City did not show the requisite probable cause for
a drug test.93 Judge Gaulkin, writing for the court, agreed that the
public had a legitimate interest in keeping the police force drug
United States Supreme Court." FraternalOrder of Police, 216 N.J. Super. at 477-78, 524
A.2d at 438-39.
90 FraternalOrderof Police, 216 N.J. Super. at 462-63, 524 A.2d at 431-32. The memorandum read in pertinent part:
Effect 0001 hours, December 12th, 1985, all members of the Narcotic
Bureau shall be required to take a urinalysis and blood test. Furthermore, any transfer into the Unit shall be predicated upon a successful
urinalysis and blood test. Any request of transfer to the Narcotic Bureau shall be forwarded with the understanding that a urinalysis exam
and blood test is required as part of the assignment, both upon transfer
and at least twice a year afterwards. These exams are to be administered
to determine: a. Health deficiencies[;] b. Substance abuse[.] ... Furthermore, all such testing shall be conducted under the supervision of the
Police Surgeon or his representative and the Internal Affairs Bureau.
All results are to be confidential and forwarded to the Police Director
for review.
Id. at 463, 524 A.2d at 431-32 (footnote omitted). The Police Director issued the
memorandum in response to concerns of abuse among the members of the department and society in general as well as the results of recent drug tests performed on
new recruits. Id. at 464, 524 A.2d at 432. The Director noted that two recent classes
"yielded 5 positive tests for such substances as cocaine, heroin, morphine and barbituates." Id. Moreover, the Director claimed that citizen tips revealed that specific individuals, including two narcotics officers, were using controlled dangerous substances.
Id.
91 Id. at 469-70, 524 A.2d at 434-35 (quotation omitted).
92 Police officers, the court proffered, did not engage in a "commercial enterprise"
and were not required to submit to drug testing as part of a "comprehensive and
defined" regulatory program. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the legislature had
not determined "'that warrantless searches [were] necessary to further a regulatory
scheme[.]'" Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)).
93 Id. at 474, 524 A.2d at 437. The appellate court defined probable cause "as
'well grounded suspicion' that a crime has been or is being committed." Id. at 466 n.5,
524 A.2d at 433 n.5 (citations omitted).
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free.9 4 The court posited, however, that with such an intrusive test,
the public interest had to be balanced against the officer's privacy
interests.9 5 To test employees for drugs, the appellate court
opined, a public employer had to show either wide-spread abuse in
96
the ranks or an identifiable public risk.
In a similar case, Local 194A v. Burlington County Bridge Commis97
sion, the NewJersey appellate division addressed whether a public
employer could drug test an employee involved in a safety-sensitive
position as part of an annual physical. 98 In Local 194A, the union
operators of draw bridges spanning the Delaware River challenged
the county's policy of drug testing the operators during their annual physicals. 9 The union claimed the drug test violated the New
Jersey Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures because the decision to test for drugs was not based
on an individual reasonable suspicion of drug use.10 0
Although the court agreed that FraternalOrder of Police, No. 12
v. City of Newark1"' demanded a standard of individual reasonable
suspicion, 10 2 the appellate court validated the drug testing of the
bridge operators. 0l'
Distinguishing Fraternal Order of Police, the
94 Id. at 472, 524 A.2d at 436. For example, the court noted that drug use "can
impair job performance and put the public at risk." Id. (citations omitted).
95 Id. at 472-73, 524 A.2d at 436.
96 Id. The appellate court also dismissed that as a matter of public safety, narcotics
officers could be subject to drug testing absent a warrant. Id. at 475, 524 A.2d at 437.
The appellate court posited that while maintaining public safety was a legitimate goal,
testing, absent an individualized reasonable suspicion, was an improper means to
achieve this goal under the state constitution. Id. For support and guidance, the
appellate court looked to the Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Screening
Guidelines. Id. at 475, 524 A.2d at 438. These guidelines stated unannounced drug
testing was appropriate for new recruits during training. Id. For permanent employees, however, an "individualized reasonable suspicion" was the standard to follow
when testing. Id. at 475-76, 524 A.2d at 438.
97 240 N.J. Super. 9, 572 A.2d 204 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 183, 584 A.2d
244 (1990).
98 Id. at 12, 13, 22, 572 A.2d at 205, 206, 211.
99 Id. at 13, 572 A.2d at 205.
100 Id. at 12, 14, 572 A.2d at 205, 207. Specifically, the union employees claimed
the rule violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments of
the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraphs two and seven of the New
Jersey Constitution. Id. at 12, 572 A.2d at 205. Additionally, the union alleged the
drug testing impaired its members' rights as public employees to negotiate employment contracts and violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-4.1. Id.
101 216 N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1987). See supra notes 87-96 and
accompanying text (discussing the individual reasonable suspicion test developed in
FraternalOrder of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark).
102 Local 194A, 240 N.J. Super. at 14-17, 572 A.2d at 207-08.
103 Id. at 11, 572 A.2d at 205.
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court stressed that the drug test was not random but rather a part
of an annual physical. °4 Thus, an employee had a lower expectation of privacy, and the decision to drug test did not require individual reasonable suspicion. 05
The appellate court also took into account the safety-sensitive
nature of a drawbridge operator's work.10 6 For guidance on the
reasonableness of the search of public employees in safety-sensitive
positions," 7 the Local 194A court looked to National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab"'8 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
104

Id. at 17, 572 A.2d at 208.

105 Id. at 17-18, 572 A.2d at 208 (citingJones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C.

Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded for further consideration, sub. nom. Jenkins, Superintendent of District of Columbia Public Schools v. Jones, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Cambria City Transp. Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898, 902 (W.D.
Pa. 1988)). The appellate court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protected "arbitrary invasions" of an individual's privacy interests. Id. at 18, 572 A.2d at 208 (citing
Amalgamated Transit Union, 691 F. Supp. at 902). The appellate court concluded that
because a person forfeited a measurable amount of personal privacy in an annual
physical, an undisclosed drug test was "minimally intrusive." Id. at 17, 572 A.2d at 208
(citations omitted).
106 Id. at 23-24, 572 A.2d at 211-13.
107 Id. at 18-22, 572 A.2d at 208-11.
108 489 U.S. 656 (1989). In National TreasuryEmployees Union v. Von Raab, the United
States Supreme Court held public employees have a reduced expectation of privacy
when public considerations of safety and security outweigh the privacy interests of the
employee. Id. at 677. In the first half of 1986, the Customs Service implemented a
drug testing requirement for employee placement into positions that involved interdicting or enforcing drug possession and distribution laws, carrying of a firearm, or
handling of classified material relating to ongoing investigations of drug smuggling.
Id. at 660-61. The unionized employees of the Customs Service challenged this policy,
inter alia, as a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 663. The district court agreed with the
employees that probable cause or reasonable suspicion was required for the Customs
Service to drug test its employees, and granted an injunction prohibiting the tests. Id.
(citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D.
La. 1986)). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's
order. Id. (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th
Cir. 1987)). The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's decision as to drug
testing employees who enforced the drug laws and carried firearms, but remanded as
to those employees who handled classified materials. Id. at 664-65.
The Supreme Court determined that drug testing was a search that must conform to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 665. Because this search
was not in pursuance of law enforcement, however, the majority posited that the rigid
requirement of a warrant was not necessary. Id. at 666. The Supreme Court reasoned
further that the probable cause standard was reserved for criminal prosecutions only
and was not applicable to the situation in the case at hand in which the employee
volunteered to work for the Customs Service knowing the position required a drug
test. Id. at 667 (quotation omitted). Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted
that the integrity of front-line law enforcement personnel in the war on drugs must be
preserved. Id. at 668. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the drug enforcement official's reasonable expectation of privacy outweighed the government's

502

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:483

Ass'n.1' The appellate court adopted the balancing test articulated in Von Raab that considered the "special need" of the government to protect public safety and the privacy interests of
individuals.11 ° Applying this test, the court recognized that drawbridge operators were in a safety-sensitive job in which the government's special need for safety outweighed the employee's reduced
expectations of privacy."' Accordingly, the court ruled that the
employees could be drug tested as part of their annual physicals.' 1 2
The NewJersey Supreme Court finally confronted the conflict
between an employee's right to privacy and the public's interest in
safety in Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co.'" The Hennessey
court addressed whether the discharge of a privately-employed atwill employee for failing a random drug test violated a clear mandate of public policy. 114 In its analysis, the court balanced the interests of the employee, employer and public. 115 Although
determining that a privacy interest in protecting an employee from
random drug testing existed, the court held that an employer
could discharge an employee for116failing such a test because the
interest of safety was paramount.

Writing for the majority, Justice Clifford first discussed the
evolution of the tort of wrongful discharge as a check on employer
abuses of the employment-at-will doctrine." 7 Relying on Pierce v.
desire to conduct suspicionless searches. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the issue
of applying a drug test to those who handle classified materials because this category
of employees was too broad and included people who did not have a reduced expectation of privacy that outweighed the government's interest. Id. at 678.
109 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Skinner involved drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 84 Stat. 971 (1970) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1992)), after certain rail accidents or violations of
safety rules. Id. at 606. Although utilizing similar reasoning to that set forth in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Supreme Court held these regulations
were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 618-34. For a discussion of
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, see supra note 108.
11o Local 194A, 240 N.J. Super. at 20, 24, 572 A.2d at 210, 212.
111 Id. at 24, 572 A.2d at 212.
112 Id. at 11, 25, 572 A.2d at 205, 212.
11" 129 N.J. 81, 100, 609 A.2d 11, 20 (1992).
114 Id. at 84-85, 609 A.2d at 12.
115 Id. at 102, 609 A.2d at 21.
116 Id. at 107, 609 A.2d at 23. In this case, the majority decided the concerns of the
public and the employer in safety outweighed the privacy interest of the employee. Id.
117 Id. at 88, 609 A.2d at 14. The NewJersey Supreme Court briefly described the
employment-at-will doctrine, believed to have its legal origin in the case of Payne v.
Western &Atlantic R R Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on othergrounds, Hutton v.
Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). Id. at 88, 609 A.2d at 14 (citing Blades, supra note 4, at
1405 & n.10). The Hennessey Court observed that in 1959 the California courts were
the first to recognize that discharge for "bad cause" was an exception to this doctrine.
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Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.," 8 the majority described the tort of
wrongful discharge as a limitation on the employer that protects
the employee from being discharged for a cause "contrary to a
clear mandate of public policy."119 Elaborating on the Pierce doctrine, the Hennessey court restated that legislation, administrative
20
rules, regulations and judicial decisions defined public policy.'
The New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that an employee
claiming wrongful discharge must articulate the specific violation
of public policy that resulted in dismissal. 21 The majority reaffirmed the Pierce conclusion that subjective and personal disagreewould not support a cause of action for
ments with the employer
22
wrongful discharge.

After discussing the origins of the Pierce doctrine, the New
Jersey Supreme Court rejected Coastal Eagle's and amici's12 3 claims

that public policy included only statutes but not federal and state
constitutions. 124 Justice Clifford continued that to exclude these
constitutions would define public policy too narrowly.' 25 The majority posited that Piercerequired the employee to indicate the speamici
cific violation of public policy and not, as defendant and
26
contended, to show a retaliatory intent by the employer.'
The Hennessey court explained further the areas in which the
New Jersey Constitution had been used as a source of public policy
in wrongful discharge cases. 127 The New Jersey Constitution, the
supreme court declared, was the "highest source of public policy"
Id. (citing Peterman v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d
25, 27 (1959)).
118 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text
(discussing Pierce v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp.).
"19 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 89, 609 A.2d at 15 (citing Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at
512). Justice Clifford engaged in a lengthy discussion of the facts and the holding in
Pierce. Id. at 88-90, 609 A.2d at 14-15.
120 Id. at 90, 609 A-2d at 15 (quoting Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512).
121 Id. at 90, 609 A.2d at 15 (citations omitted).
122 Id. at 91-92, 609 A.2d at 15-16 (citations omitted).
123 The following groups submitted amid curiae briefs supporting various positions
of this controversial issue: the American Civil Liberties Union, the NewJersey Department of the Public Advocate, the Employment Law Council, the Washington Legal
Foundation and Parents' Association to Neutralize Drug and Alcohol Abuse, and the
Equal Employment Advisory Council. Id. at 84, 609 A.2d at 12.
124 Id. at 92, 609 A.2d at 16.
125 Id.
126 Id. (citing Pierce v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp., 84 N.J. 58, 73, 417 A.2d 505, 512
(1980)).
127 Id. at 92-93, 609 A.2d at 16 (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Radwan v. Beecham Labs., 850 F.2d 147, 151-52 (3d
Cir. 1988); Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899
(1988)) (further citations omitted).
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and therefore a foundation for a claim of wrongful discharge. 12
With this proposition firmly established, Justice Clifford determined which provision of the state constitution provided a privacy
right. 29 Agreeing with the appellate division, the majority asserted
that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures did not apply to private employers. 30 The supreme
court criticized, however, the conclusion that the New Jersey Constitution could not be a source of protection from drug testing
mandated by private employers.'13 Justice Clifford found the right
of privacy to be an unalienable right derived from the natural
law.'3 2 The majority then described various contexts in which the
right to privacy had been used to protect individual liberty and
autonomy. 3 3
Additionally, the Hennessey court looked to the long recognized invasion of privacy tort as another source of public policy.TM
Id. at 93, 609 A.2d at 17.
Id. at 94, 609 A.2d at 17.
Id. at 95, 609 A.2d at 17. The Supreme Court criticized, however, the appellate
division's interpretation of the Alaska case, Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768
P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989), as "misplaced." Id. The majority interpreted Luedtke to
show that the Alaska Supreme Court might allow the use of a constitutional privacy
provision as a source of public policy. Id. at 94, 609 A.2d at 17 (citing Luedtke, 768
P.2d at 1132-33). For a discussion of Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. see infra
note 138.
'3' Henmessey, 129 N.J. at 95, 609 A.2d at 17-18. Specifically, the Hennessey court
admonished the appellate division for giving "short shrift to the notion that privacy
could be a source of public policy." Id., 609 A.2d at 18.
132 Id. at 95-96, 609 A.2d at 18 (citing McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J.Eq. 24, 43
A.2d 514 (Ch. Div.), affd, 137 NJ. Eq. 548, 45 A.2d 842 (1945)). The New Jersey
Constitution, Article I, Paragraph 1 states: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." NJ. CONST. art. I,
para. 1 (1947).
133 Hennessey, 129 NJ. at 96, 609 A.2d at 18 (citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99
N.J. 552, 494 A.2d 294 (1985); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925
(1982); In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 447 A.2d 1290 (1982); In re Grady, 85 NJ. 235, 426
A.2d 467 (1981); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Doe v. Bridgeton
Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977);
State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647, cert. denied sub norn. Garger v. NewJersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Comras v. Lewin, 183 N.J. Super. 42, 443 A.2d
229 (App. Div. 1982)).
134 Id. at 94-95, 609 A.2d at 17 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
(1977)). Specifically, the tort of intrusion on seclusion states: "One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF ToRTs § 652B (1977).
128
129
130
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The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that an invasion of privacy
did not have to be physical but could also consist of an investigation into a person's private affairs. 135
The majority next addressed whether a random drug test violated Hennessey's constitutional or common law privacy rights despite Hennessey's failure to raise this claim.' 36 Analyzing this issue,
Justice Clifford adopted the holding of Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska
Drilling,Inc.'37 in which the Alaska Supreme Court employed a balancing test to decide the scope of the employee's privacy interest.138 The Hennessey court recognized that the public policy of
'35 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 95, 609 A.2d at 17 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977)).
136 Id. at 96-97, 609 A.2d at 18. The court pronounced, however, that it was unnecessary to resolve whether those rights supported a cause of action for wrongful discharge under "a clear mandate of public policy." Id.
137 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
138 Id. at 1135-36. In Luedtke, two brothers, Paul and Clarence Luedtke, refused to
submit urine for drug testing required by their employer, Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.
(Nabors). Id. at 1124-25. Prior to his refusal to submit a urine sample, Paul had been
reprimanded for two workplace violations: in the first an alcohol infraction was involved, and in the second trained dogs discovered marijuana in Paul's luggage on his
oil drilling rig. Id. at 1125. During a routine physical, Nabors obtained a sample of
Paul's urine without notifying him that the sample would be tested for drugs. Id.
Paul's urine tested positive for marijuana. Id. at 1126. Paul was suspended until he
could pass two subsequent urine drug tests. Id. He refused to take the first test and
was discharged. Id.
Unlike Paul, a permanent employee of the oil drilling company, Clarence
Luedtke was a seasonal worker who was required to submit a urine sample but refused
"as a matter of principle." Id. Clarence was terminated immediately. Id. Both were
initially denied unemployment benefits because their refusal was deemed misconduct
under Alaska unemployment law. Id. As a result of their refusal to submit urine for
testing, both Paul and Clarence were denied unemployment compensation benefits
on grounds that their noncompliance constituted misconduct. Id. Paul and Clarence
then successfully appealed the decision to deny benefits to the Department of Labor
(DOL). Id. In the case of Clarence, the Commissioner of Labor determined that
"Nabors [had] not shown that there [was] any connection between off-the-job drug use
and on-the-job performance." Id. at 1126-27.
Each filed a separate court action against Nabors claiming inter alia wrongful
discharge and invasion of privacy. Id. at 1126-27. The trial court granted Nabors's
motion for summary judgment on all of Clarence's claims and on Paul's invasion of
privacy claim. Id. Paul's wrongful discharge claim was decided in favor of Nabors
after a non-jury trial. Id. at 1126. The Alaska Supreme Court consolidated the appeals because common legal issues existed. Id. at 1125.
The Alaska Supreme Court began by reiterating that a cause of action for wrongful discharge stemmed from contract law, which found an implied covenant of good
faith in employment-at-will contracts. Id. at 1130. The Alaska Supreme Court then
recognized that public policy included a right of privacy that protects certain parts of
an employee's life from employer control or inquiry. Id. at 1131-32. The public policy supporting this privacy right, the supreme court explained, was evidenced in the
common law tort of invasion of privacy, the state constitution and statutes that prohibit employers from inquiring into areas considered private. Id. at 1132-33.
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protecting safety would compete with the privacy interest of an employee in certain situations."3 9 Specifically, Justice Clifford posited
that when the nature of the employee'sjob entailed a responsibility
for public safety, the privacy interests of the employee were
subordinate and a random drug test was permissible." °
Turning to the case at hand, the majority addressed two examples of privacy interests that Hennessey complained Coastal Eagle's
random drug test violated: the observation by another when providing a urine sample and the possibility of detecting private information irrelevant to the employer's quest to find illegal
substances. 1 41 Justice Clifford accepted Hennessey's claim that random drug testing by a private employer could be an invasion of
privacy that violates public policy.' 4 2 The Hennessey court, qualified
this proposition, however, stating that an employee's privacy could
be invaded permissibly if a competing public policy interest exThe Luedtke court clarified, however, that the privacy interests of an individual
are reduced when he or she begins to interact with the community. Id. at 1135. Specifically, the supreme court continued that where an employee's interaction with the
community conflicted with the community's interests in safety, the community's interests outweighed the individual's privacy interests. Id. at 1135-36. The Alaska Supreme
Court, however, placed two limitations on the employer's right to drug test. Id. at
1136, 1137. First, the supreme court advised that the test must be conducted in a way
that reasonably connected the performance of the worker to the use of drugs or alco
hol. Id. at 1136-37. In the case of the Luedtke brothers, the court asserted that testing should have been done either prior to departure or upon return from a drilling
operation. Id. Second, the Luedtke Court continued that the worker must have notice
of the drug testing program. Id. at 1137. Because the safety interests of the community in having oil rig operators free from alcohol and drugs outweighed the brothers'
interests in privacy and the Luedtke brothers had notice of the test, the supreme
court affirmed the lower courts' rulings that refusal to submit to a urine test did not
support a claim of wrongful discharge. Id. at 1136, 1137, 1138.
Justice Clifford recognized that other states have adopted this balancing test
when evaluating a wrongful discharge claim resulting from employer drug testing of
employees. Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 100, 609 A.2d at 20. After re-examining the Luedtke
decision, the Hennessey court described California's approach in Luck v. Southern Pacific Transp. Go., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990),
and West Virginia's approach in Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1990).
Id. at 101, 609 A.2d at 20-21. Agreeing with Luedtkhe and Tuigg, the Hennessey majority
proclaimed that for an employee to claim successfully wrongful discharge he must
show that his privacy interest outweighed the public's interest in safety. Id at 102, 609
A.2d at 21.
139 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 100, 609 A.2d at 20.
140 Id. at 102, 609 A.2d at 21. An employee's position involved awareness of public
safety, the court concluded, when the employee's duties were "so fraught with hazard
that.., attempts to perform [those duties] while in a state of drug impairment would
pose a threat to coworkers, to the workplace, or to the public." Id.
141 Id. at 99, 609 A.2d at 19. For example, a urine sample to test for the presence of
drugs, Hennessey contended, might reveal the presence of epilepsy. Id.
142 Id.
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isted. 143 An employee's privacy interests, the majority concluded,

were only one of many competing interests considered in defining
public policy.'"
To weigh these competing interests, Justice Clifford opined
that absent guidance by either the legislature or a collective bargaining agreement, a judicial definition of a safety-sensitive position was warranted. 14 A safety-sensitive position, the majority then
defined, was one in which the duties were so "fraught with hazard"
that performance of them in an altered mental state could pose a
1 46
threat to co-workers, the work environment or the public.
Applying the balancing test to Hennessey's position as supervisor of the gaugers, the supreme court concluded that public safety
outweighed Hennessey's privacy interests. 4 7 To support this conclusion, Justice Clifford relied on testimony concerning the dangerous nature of a gauger's position 14 from Coastal Eagle's
administrators and Hennessey himself.14 9
Furthermore, the majority rejected Hennessey's claim that the
holding in FraternalOrder of Police5 ° required a private employer to
use the least intrusive means available to test for drugs.' 5 ' The ma143 Id., 609 A.2d at 19-20.

Id.
Id. at 102, 609 A.2d at 21.
Id.
147 Id. at 107, 609 A.2d at 23.
148 Id. at 102-03, 609 A.2d at 21. A gauger's duties, the court instructed, included
mixing gasoline with additives and supervising the flow of gasoline products throughout the refinery. Id. at 85, 609 A.2d at 12-13. The court explained further that a
gauger takes direction from the leader pumper who translates instructions and orders
into the appropriate gauge levels for the gaugers. Id., 609 A.2d at 13. A lead pumper,
therefore, must have an ability to calculate gauge levels precisely, interpret and convey orders effectively, and maintain records accurately. Id.
149 Id. at 102-03, 609 A.2d at 21. The court noted that several administrators from
Coastal Eagle stated that the managers in the gauging area received little supervision
and were often required to work overtime to handle emergencies. Id. at 103, 609
A.2d at 21. Citing an affidavit from the Movement and Storage Division Manager, the
court asserted that the consequences of error in a gauger's position included fires
and/or explosions resulting in severe injury or even death, environmental damage
and property damage. Id. The court also recognized Hennessey's own acknowledgment of the potential dangers associated with a gauger's responsibility to insure
against tank overflows. Id. Specifically, the court quoted portions of Hennessey's deposition in which he responded to the question of why it was important for him to take
care that the oil tanks did not overflow. Id. The supreme court reiterated Hennessey's answer which stated: "You don't want oil on the ground for one thing because
it's wasted product. And if it's volatile enough, you have an explosion." Id.
150 See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text (discussing FraternalOrder of Police).
151 Id. at 103-04, 609 A.2d at 22. Hennessey argued that an alternative test based on
performance and observation would be not only less intrusive but more accurate in
detecting behavior such as stress that, like drugs or alcohol, may impair job perform144

145
146
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jority posited that the availability and practicality of investigative
alternatives depended on the facts of each case. 15 2 Distinguishing
FraternalOrder of Police, the Hennessey court asserted that police officers are heavily supervised and therefore more suitable candidates for the less intrusive observational test. 153 Conversely,
because gauge supervisors functioned with little supervision, the
majority found that Hennessey occupied a position that rendered
an observational test for drug or alcohol impairment impractical."' In rejecting Hennessey's claim that urine testing did not
indicate actual impairment, the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning in National Federation of FederalEmployees v.
Cheney, 155 which recognized that urinalysis, although not perfect,
was nonetheless suitable for detecting drugs and therefore promoted public safety.' 5 6
The majority concluded its decision by recommending that
employers provide adequate notice of the test date, limit testing to
ance. Id. at 103, 609 A.2d at 22. The Department of the Public Advocate also supported this argument as amicus curiae. Id. at 104, 609 A.2d at 22.
152 Id. The Hennessey court concluded that Coastal Eagle had chosen the best and
least intrusive means of finding drug use that could endanger the public. Id. at 106,
609 A.2d at 23. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that in this case, unlike
FraternalOrder of Police, there was an indication that drug use was widespread among
the employees, and that this use presented an identifiable danger to the public. Id. at
104, 609 A.2d at 22.
153 Id. at 105-06, 609 A.2d at 23.
154 Id. at 106, 609 A.2d at 23.
155 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
156 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 106, 609 A.2d at 23. In NationalFed'n of Fed. Employees, the
civilian employees of the Department of Defense initiated an action in response to a
program that required those employees to submit to a mandatory random urinalysis
drug test. NationalFed'n of Fed. Employees, 884 F.2d at 605. The government justified
the testing on three grounds: determining employee fitness; maintaining national security, and identifying and treating drug abusers. Id. at 608. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989), for its holding that random drug testing of civilian guards and police officers
was constitutional because these individuals had a reduced expectation of privacy that
allowed a search without individual reasonable suspicion. Id. at 612-13.
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected, however, the government's claim that
employees involved in the chain of custody of the drug test specimens were not protected by the more stringent requirements of probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 615. The court of appeals proffered that a sufficient nexus between the government's interest in reliable testing procedures and the employee's
duty did not exist. Id. at 614. Additionally, the court refuted the averment that lab
personnel who worked in the urine specimen chain of custody had a reduced expectation of privacy analogous to the security guards and police officers. Id. at 614-15.
Accordingly, the court of appeals vacated and remanded the district court's decision
to determine the reasonableness of the government's drug testing program within
this category of employees. Id. at 615.
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drugs, keep the results confidential and inform the employee of
the consequences of a positive test and the possible causes of falsepositive results.1 57 The Hennessey court indicated that because an
employee's privacy interests are invaded by random drug tests, adequate precautions should be developed.1" 8 Justice Clifford opined,
however, that the establishment of guidelines for drug testing in
the workplace was an issue that would be resolved more appropriately by the legislature and collective bargaining agreements than
by the courts.' 5 9 The court reasoned that the legislature had more
experience in defining the limits of testing individuals in other
had taken
types of settings."6 0 Moreover, other state legislatures
16 1
steps to control drug testing in different contexts.
Justice Pollock concurred in upholding Coastal Eagle's use of
random drug testing of employees in safety-sensitive positions because such testing did not violate public policy.1 62 Moreover, the
concurrence agreed that both the common law and the NewJersey
Constitution were sources of public policy, and that legislation and
private agreements could better delineate the boundaries of workplace drug testing. 6 ' Justice Pollock disagreed, however, that the
NewJersey Constitution supported a clear mandate of public policy
The
against an invasion of privacy in wrongful discharge cases."
justice criticized the majority for deciding a constitutional issue
when the case did not require such a resolution. 65 Instead, the
concurrence posited that the common law tort of invasion of privacy was a more preferable source of public policy because that
action addressed and transported fairness and justice into judicial
decision-making.'
Justice Pollock maintained that the common law rather than
the state's constitution provided a more suitable means for resolving disputes between private parties. 1 67 The New Jersey ConstituHennessey, 129 N.J. at 106-07, 609 A.2d at 23.
Id. at 106, 609 A.2d at 23.
159 Id. at 102, 107, 609 A.2d at 21, 23.
160 Id. at 107, 609 A.2d at 23-24 (citations omitted).
161 Id. at 107-08, 609 A.2d at 24 (citations omitted).
162 Id. at 108, 609 A.2d at 24 (Pollock, J., concurring).
157
158

163 Id.

Id. at 108-09, 609 A.2d at 24 (Pollock, J., concurring).
Id. at 109-10, 609 A.2d at 24-25 (Pollock, J., concurring). Because the majority
used the NewJersey Constitution as a source of public policy, the concurrence found
unpersuasive the majority's contention that the case was not decided on constitutional grounds. Id. at 109, 609 A.2d at 24-25 (Pollock, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 110, 609 A.2d at 25 (Pollock, J., concurring).
167 Id. Specifically, Justice Pollock wrote: "[T]he common law provides an alternative, and potentially more stable, framework for analyzing statements about matters of
164
165
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tion, the concurrence criticized, controlled the relationship
between government and the individual, not the relationship between individuals. 6' Looking to the history of the tort of invasion
of privacy, the concurrence concluded that this action originally
governed actions among private parties.'" 9 Justice Pollock emphasized that it was not until Griswold v. Connecticut 70 that the right of
privacy elevated from a tort to a constitutional right protecting individuals from government action. 17 1 Accordingly, the majority's
reliance on the state constitution, the concurrence contended,
abandoned the state's "common-law birthright" to172settle disputes
between private parties through the common law.
Justice Pollock differentiated between the public policy found
by the majority and the public policy found in other wrongful discharge cases. 173 In this case, the concurrence posited that neither
the New Jersey Constitution nor any statute specifically expressed a
right of privacy that would modify the employment-at-will doctrine1 74 Furthermore, Justice Pollock speculated that a discharge
in violation of public policy that protects an individual's privacy
rights would be less apparent than a dismissal that violates one's
statutory rights. 175 The justice concluded that judicial activism had
176
no role in formulating policy on drug testing in the workplace.
The concurrence recommended, therefore, that a holding based
the legisexclusively on the common law tort of privacy would 1give
77
lature significant latitude in formulating this policy.

Justice Pollock then explained that the scope of the privacy
right found in both the United States Constitution and the New
Jersey Constitution involved two interests: autonomy and confidenpublic interest." Id. (quoting Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 104 N.J. 125, 139,
516 A.2d 220 (1986)).
168 Id. at 109, 609 A.2d at 24-25 (Pollock, J., concurring).
169 Id. at 110, 609 A.2d at 25 (Pollock, J., concurring).
170 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswo/d the United States Supreme Court held that a
Connecticut statute that forbade the use of contraceptives between married persons
was an unconstitutional invasion of an individual's right to privacy under the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 480, 485-86.
171 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 110, 609 A.2d at 25 (Pollock,J., concurring) (citing Griswold 381 U.S. at 510 n.1 (Black, J., dissenting)).
172 Id. at 111, 609 A.2d at 25 (Pollock, J., concurring).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 111, 609 A.2d at 25-26 (Pollock, J., concurring).
175 Id. at 111, 609 A.2d at 26 (Pollock, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 112, 609 A.2d at 26 (Pollock, J., concurring).
177 Id. Conversely, using the New Jersey Constitution as support for its ruling, the
justice criticized, would limit the legislature's response in regulating drug testing in
the workplace. Id.
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tiality. 17 a Of the two, Justice Pollock concluded, autonomy was a
fundamental right, and confidentiality was not.179 Because drug
testing only impacted an employee's confidentiality interest, the
justice stressed that the majority should not have looked to the
New Jersey Constitution as support. 180 Justice Pollock agreed, however, with the majority that because the drug test involved only confidentiality,1 the public interest in safety was an overriding
18
concern.
Justice Pollock stressed that when a court decides a constitutional privacy issue, it risks placing undefined areas of personal decision-making beyond the control of the Legislature. 8 2 The
concurrence advised that because of the competing interests of the
employer and employee, the Legislature could better address an
18 3
individual's privacy rights by applying common law principles.
As an example of how the common law provided a means of resolving privacy issues while allowing the legislature to act, Justice Pollock looked to the court's development of the "right to die."184
Finally, Justice Pollock lectured the majority for failing to address the public policy considerations of discouraging illegal drug
use.' 85 The concurring justice reminded the majority that both the
Legislature and Governor had publicly stated that illegal drug use
in the workplace should be eradicated by implementing drug testing procedures. 18 6 The concurrence concluded that the majority
had frustrated this attempt to eradicate drug use by relying on the
Id. (quotations omitted).
Id. at 112-15, 609 A.2d at 26-27 (Pollock, J., concurring).
180 Id. at 115, 609 A.2d at 27 (Pollock, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 114, 609 A.2d at 27 (Pollock, J., concurring).
182 Id. at 113, 609 A.2d at 27 (Pollock, J., concurring).
183 Id. at 113-14, 609 A.2d at 27 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock looked to
the administration of drug tests by some federal agencies as an example of how confidentiality could be preserved without direct observation of the employee giving the
specimen. Id. at 114, 609 A.2d at 27 (Pollock, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
federal and state statutes that govern the administration of drug testing, see supra
notes 9 and 77.
184 Id. at 113, 609 A.2d at 26-27 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock outlined
the evolution of the "right to die" as an example of how the right to privacy had
shifted from being a constitutional one to a common law one. Id. (Pollock,J., concurring) (citing In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re
Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987)).
185 Id. at 116, 609 A.2d at 28 (Pollock, J., concurring).
186 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1.1(b); Robert Schwaenberg, Drugs in the
Workplace: Chamberof Commerce, StateJoin to Chart Test Policy, THE STAR-LEDGER, July 11,
1992, at 1 (reporting on the Governor's establishment of Governor's Council for a
Drug Free Workplace)).
178
179
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New Jersey Constitution.
In Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co. the New Jersey
Supreme Court has called on the New Jersey Legislature to set
guidelines for private employment drug testing."8 As a recent
study indicated, private employer drug testing has increased over
the last five years. 8 9 Although most of these companies employed
over 5,000 people and could afford adequate follow-up tests for
positive results, many of the smaller companies did not implement
confirmatory procedures. 9 °
Because of the risk of inaccurate results, private employment
drug testing needs to be regulated by statute. A public debate on
this issue should focus on the competing interests of the employee,
the employer and the public so that comprehensive guidelines can
be implemented to insure accuracy, privacy and accountability. As
much of the medical literature has suggested, the effectiveness of
drug testing depends upon the accuracy of the results. 1 91 In enacting legislation for drug testing, the legislature should consider employment drug testing as a form of forensic medicine governed by
the same rigid chain of custody rules. 9 2 Additionally, all front line
drug tests should be confirmed with a more accurate test such as a
gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test.' 93 For guidance, the
Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 116, 609 A.2d at 28 (Pollock, J., concurring).
Id. at 107, 609 A.2d at 23 (1992).
Donald Warshaw, Morefirms are testingfor drugs;positive percentagesstill decline, THE
STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 2, 1993, at 3. A 1992 survey by the American Management Association showed that 85 percent of the large and medium firms included in the study had
drug-tested personnel in one form or another. Id. This same survey in 1991 indicated
that 74 percent of the firms had tested for drugs. Id. The survey showed that 8.5
percent of those tested in New Jersey produced positive results. Id.
The survey also reported that for employees who tested positive, 54 percent of
the companies offered counselling to the individual and 28 percent dismissed the
employee. Id. Nationwide, the survey continued, random drug testing of employees
was performed by 33 percent of the firms questioned. Id.
Of concern to the American Management Association was the employer's failure
to confirm positive results with proper validating tests. Id. The survey indicated that
only 23 percent of the firms did not use a more accurate follow-up test such as a gas
chromatology test. Id. Surprisingly, the survey revealed that some firms had no follow-up test at all. Id.
190 Id.
191 For a discussion of the accuracy problems in testing employees for drugs from
urine samples, see supra note 12. Additionally, the usefulness of the tests hinges on
the ability of highly trained individuals to administer and interpret the tests. Dubowski, supra note 14, at 418.
192 Dubowski, supra note 14, at 417-18.
193 Schwartz & Hawks, supranote 14, at 193. Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry involves separating chemicals in a biological extract in order to identify the presence of a particular substance. Scientific Issues, supra note 14, at 3113. A gas
187
188
189
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New Jersey Legislature should look to other states that have enacted employee drug testing statutes. 94 Although follow-up testing
will increase employer costs, such procedures will not only insure
that the employee is given a fair chance to rebut any false positive
results but will fulfill society's goal of having unimpaired workers
occupying safety-sensitive positions.
Justice Pollock's criticism of the majority for deciding a constitutional issue when the case did not require the supreme court to
do so was misguided. 95 Justice Pollock correctly indicated that
both Article I, Paragraph 1 and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution protect the privacy interests of the individual
from state action; the majority, however, did not hold on constitutional grounds.' 96 Instead, the majority simply looked to the state
constitution as a source of public policy for the tort of wrongful
discharge.' 9 7 Ultimately, the parameters of public policy, the majority decided, lay in the rubric of the common law tort of wrongful
discharge.' 98 The supreme court looked only to the state constitution because no legislation existed to guide them on the issue of
private employment drug testing.19 The legislature, therefore, is
not restricted in its attempt to enact statutes governing private employment drug testing.
Finally, the Hennessey decision indicated the New Jersey
Supreme Court's willingness to expand the rights of employees in
the area of private employment.2"' The NewJersey Supreme Court
chromatograph scans the extract and separates compounds into fragments of electrically charged ions. Id. No two fragments are alike. Id. The mass spectrometer is
then used to confirm both a presence and amount of drugs and drug metabolites
separated from the biological specimens. Id.; Dubowski, supra note 14, at 469.
Gas chromatography is one of the most common methods used to confirm positive drug tests. Id. Gas chromatography, however, has several drawbacks. Scientific
Issues, supra note 14, at 3113-14. First, the equipment to perform the procedure is
extremely expensive and time consuming as it can only process samples one at a time.
Id. at 3113. Second, highly trained personnel are required to operate the equipment.
Id. at 3113-14. See also Dubowski, supra note 14, at 473 (discussing the skills required
of a technician who performs a gas chromatography test). As a result, some commentators advocate using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry only as a confirmatory
test. Schwartz & Hawk, supranote 14, at 790; Scientific Issues, supranote 14, at 3113-14.
194 See supra note 9 (outlining Connecticut's statute on employee drug testing).
'95 Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 109, 609 A.2d 11, 24-25
(1992) (Pollock, J., concurring).
196 Id. at 96-97, 609 A.2d at 18.
197 Id. at 97-98, 609 A.2d at 18-19.
198 Id. at 90-92, 609 A.2d at 15-16.
199 Id. at 102, 609 A.2d at 21.
200 For additional New Jersey cases discussing the tort of wrongful discharge, see
Velantzas v. Colgate-PalmoliveCo., 109 N.J. 189, 191-92, 536 A.2d 237, 238 (1988) (holding that employment discrimination based on gender is a violation of public policy
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properly focused on the duties of the employee to establish the
permissible scope of employer inquiry into the private affairs of the
employee. 20 1 The employer should only be permitted only to inquire into employee behavior that will have a recognizable influence on the employee's performance. 2 This task is difficult and
varies considerably from job to job. Accordingly, the business community and organized labor should collectively bargain the limits
of an employer's intrusion into an employee's private life. For industries in which unions do not have an influence, legislative guidance on the definition of a safety-sensitive position is necessary.
The Legislature's failure to define safety-sensitive positions will reduce employer drug testing. Employers will be fearful of litigation
over wrongly deciding the employee occupies such a position and
20 3
then terminating

that employee for a positive drug test.

Although the majority opinion provided some guidance defining a
safety-sensitive position, the question remains as to how an employer is to know which employee occupies a position that is
"fraught with hazard" and "pose[s] a threat to coworkers, to the
workplace, or the public at large." 2 4 Articulating standards to determine the nature of a safety-sensitive position would harmonize
the interests of society in eradicating workplace drug use with the
privacy interests of the employee in preserving confidential information irrelevant to his or her employment.
Richardj Brightman
and supports a claim of wrongful discharge); House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.
Super. 42, 49, 556 A.2d 353, 358 (App. Div.) (holding that merely voicing one's opposition to a corporate policy is insufficient to support a claim of wrongful discharge),
certif denied, 117 N.J. 154, 564 A.2d 874 (1989); Lepore v. National Tool and Mfg. Co.,
224 N.J. Super. 463, 466, 473, 540 A.2d 1296, 1297, 1301 (App. Div. 1988) (stating
that retaliatory discharge for reporting a Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
violation, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., is grounds for wrongful discharge claim), aff'd, 115
N.J. 226, 557 A.2d 1371 (1989); Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc., 224 N.J. Super 21, 30, 539
A.2d 744, 749 (App Div. 1988) (finding no violation of public policy occurred when
an employer discharged an employee to avoid paying commissions to that employee);
Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 223 N.J. Super. 435, 443-44, 538 A.2d 1292, 1296-97
(App. Div. 1988) (concluding that an employee's wrongful discharge claim in which
an employer terminated that employee in an attempt to prevent the filing of a
worker's compensation claim should not have been dismissed); Alexander v. Kay Finley
Jewelers, Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 503, 508, 506 A.2d 379, 381 (App. Div. 1985) (holding
that discharge based on private salary dispute between employer and employee was
not a violation of public policy), certif denied, 104 N.J. 466, 517 A.2d 449 (1986).
201 Hennessey, 129 N.J. 102-03, 609 A.2d at 21.
202 Blades, supra note 4, at 1406-07.
203 See generally Knapp & McLester, supra note 15 (discussing the implications of
Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co.).
204 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 102, 609 A.2d at 21.

